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THE BITTER WITH THE SWEET: THE IMPACT OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION'S SETTLEMENT OF THE
BANANA TRADE DISPUTE ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF ECUADORIAN BANANA WORKERS
MAXMILLIAN FINLEY
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of May 16, 2002, approximately 400 hooded
men brutally attacked banana workers on the Los Alamos planta-
tions, owned by the Noboal company in Ecuador.2 These workers
had been on a legal and non-violent strike since May 6th,3 "pro-
testing for proper working conditions and their rights under Ecua-
dorian law." 4 Reports indicate that the hooded men banged on
workers' doors, dragged roughly eighty of them from their homes,
hit many of them with rifles, looted their homes, and threatened to
kill the workers and dump them into the river.5 The armed men
remained on the plantation into the early evening, at which time
1. Noboa is short for Grupo Noboa, an Ecuadorian banana corporation. The
corporation is largest exporter of Ecuadorian bananas and the fourth largest banana
company in the world. See US/LEAP, Banana Workers Campaign: Banana Industry Crisis,
at http://www.usleap.org/Banana/bananatemp.html#noboa (last visited 10/24/02). See
also Robert Perillo, Banana Workers and Transnationals: An Industry Crisis, U.S./Labor
Education in the Americas Project (US/LEAP), (October 28, 2000), available at http://
www.usleap.org/Banana/crisis/BananaStudy8-00.html.
2. The Noboa Corporation is owned by, Alvaro Noboa, who was a leading presi-
dential candidate in Ecuador's October elections. Two Attack**, Intimidation of Ecuado-
rian Banana Workers! Noboa Admits to Hiring Armed Thugs, USLEAP (May 24, 2002),
available at http://www.usleap.org/Banana/Noboa/TwoAttackUpdate5-24-02.html.
3. See Armed Men Attack Ecuadorian Banana Workers Organizing For Their Ba-
sic Right, Banana Link, at http://www.bananalink.org.uk/trade.war/tradewar.htm
(17 May 2002) (last visited 11/25/02).
4. See Constituci6n Politica de la Republica de Ecuador, 1998, Article 35(9). [Po-
litical Constitution of Ecuador, 1998], available at http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/
Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98.html. [Hereinafter Constitution]; Codificacion del
Codigo del Trabajo, Articles 447, 467 [National Code of Labor], available at http://
natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECUO1.htm. [Hereinafter Labor Code]. See also Ecuador: Esca-
lating Violence Against Banana Workers, Human Rights Watch, (May 22, 2002) at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/ecuador0522.htm.
5. See Ecuador: Escalating Violence Against Banana Workers, Human Rights
Watch, May 22, 2002 at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/ecuadorO522.htm.
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they purportedly told all striking workers to "leave the premises by
6:30 P.M. or be forcibly evicted."'6 Shortly after 6:00 P.M., with the
workers showing no sign of leaving, the armed men allegedly began
shooting, critically injuring one worker, "and causing the subse-
quent amputation of that worker's leg. Several others, including a
police officer, were also injured."'7 Reports indicate that at 8:00
P.M., police reinforcements finally arrived and arrested approxi-
mately twenty of the armed thugs.8 This violence came almost a
year after the Dispute Settlement Resolution 9 in the banana trade
sector between the European Union 10 and United States.11 This
circumstance is just one example of a reoccurring theme for Ecua-
dorian banana unions, as it becomes apparent that the workers lack
the power to negotiate for proper working conditions.1 2
6. See Human Rights Watch, Ecuador: Escalating Violence Against Banana Work-
ers, supra note 5.
7. See Banana Link, supra note 3.
8. See Human Rights Watch, Ecuador: Escalating Violence Against Banana Work-
ers, supra note 5.
9. "The WTO's procedure for resolving trade quarrels under the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding is vital for enforcing the rules and therefore for ensuring that
trade flows smoothly. A dispute arises when a member government believes another
member government is violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made in
the WTO. The authors of these agreements are the member governments themselves
[and] the agreements are the outcome of negotiations among members. Ultimate re-
sponsibility for settling disputes also lies with member governments, through the Dis-
pute Settlement Body." See World Trade Organization (WTO), Dispute settlement,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm#negotiations
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
10. "The European Union (EU) was set up after the 2nd World War. The process
of European integration was launched on May 9, 1950 when France officially proposed
to create 'the first concrete foundation of a European federation'. Six countries
(Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) joined from the
very beginning. Today, after four waves of accessions (1973: Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom; 1981: Greece; 1986: Spain and Portugal; 1995: Austria, Finland and
Sweden) the EU has 15 Member States and is preparing for the accession of 13 eastern
and southern European countries." See TakingItGlobal, The European Union On-Line, at
http://www.takingitglobal.org/opps/orgdir.html?vieworg=2447 (last visited Sept. 11,
2003).
11. On April 11, 2001, the U.S. Government and the European Commission
reached an agreement to resolve their long-standing dispute over bananas. IP/01/562,
April 11, 2001 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/us/news/
ip_01-562.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
12. See Human Rights Watch, Ecuador: Escalating Violence Against Banana Work-
ers, supra note 5.
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This note examines the ramifications of the World Trade Or-
ganization's Dispute Settlement of the banana trade war on Ecua-
dorian banana workers. The growing labor rights issues of
Ecuadorian banana workers necessitate the United States to take
action for the sake of human rights and international democracy.
Part II of this Note discusses the history of the banana trade dis-
pute, and the final banana dispute settlement. 13 Part III examines
the effects of increased production in Ecuador on banana workers,
the Ecuadorian government's discouragement in the association of
labor unions, and the blind eye shown by U.S. multinationals
1 4 to-
wards worker's human rights in this area.15 Part IV examines how
the U.S. government could protect Ecuadorian workers using cur-
rent U.S. trade policy and U.S. and international law. These mea-
sures would enable workers to bring suit against the multinational
corporations that are aiding in the denial of their human rights, or
would encourage change by the Ecuadorian government through
denial of federal aid and trade benefits from the US. Part V con-
cludes that the Ecuadorian labor situation is similar to the U.S. past
labor situation, and that history shows U.S. how important free asso-
ciation and labor conditions are to democracy.
II. THE BANANA TRADE
A. The History
The European Union (EU) is a very significant player in the
world banana trade.16 The EU imports more agricultural goods
13. The formal name given to the dispute settlement by the WTO is "US import
measures on EC products - Brought by EC DS165." World Trade Organization, Dispute
Settlement - Index of Dispute Issues, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu-e/dispu subjectsindexe.htm#bkmk9 (last visited Jan. 1, 2004).
14. Multinational enterprises are companies which own or control production,
distribution, services or other facilities outside their base country, whether they are of
public, mixed or private ownership. See International Guidelines - Tripartitie Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, International Labor Organ-
ization (Nov. 1977), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/
gems/eeo/inter/ilo.htm.
15. See Tainted Harvest: Child Labor and Obstacles to Organizing on Ecuador's Banana
Plantations, Summary Human Rights Watch, (April 2002), at http://hrw.org/reports/
2002/ecuador/ecuad0402-01 .htm#P239_15845.
16. The European Union estimated imports of bananas in 2001 is 3169 thousands
tons, which is second largest amount of import only to the US. Bananas: Commodities
Notes, Final Results of 2001, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
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from developing countries than the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand combined1 7 and imports about a third of all
traded bananas.' 8 In fact, the EU is the only major banana market
in the world that has any tariffs and limits on volumes imported.' 9
Thus, EU policies20 have a major impact on the world trade in
bananas. 2
1
Although the EU has a major impact on the banana trade, the
three biggest banana producing companies - Chiquita, Dole and
Del Monte - together produce and control over two thirds of world
exports, 22 allowing them to control the market and set the rules for
Economic and Social Department (ES), Commodities and Trade Division (ECS), availa-
ble at http://www.fao.org/es/esc/en/20953/20987/highlight_28367en.html (last up-
dated Oct. 2002).
17. Facts and Figures on EU Trade in agricultural products: open to trade, open to develop-
ing countries, EU Institution Press Release, MEMO/02/296, (12/16/2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMO/
02/296-0-RAPID&lg=EN&display=.
18. The projected net imports of bananas for the European Union for 2005 are
3411 thousand tons. The total estimated imports for all developed nations during that
same period is 10,642 thousand tons. Projection for supply and demand of Bananas to 2005,
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1st Sess., Committee On
Commodity Problems, Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and on Tropical Fruits,
U.N. Doc. CCP: BA/TF 99/5, available at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/waicent/pub/ccp/
bntff99/X1065e.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
19. The U.S. and Japan, the next two largest markets, allow bananas in freely,
without any tariffs and without limits on volumes imported. See Id. See also
Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, Banana Link, at http://www.bananalink.org.
uk/trade/btrade.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2004).
20. One of the major EU policies is the General System of Preferences (GSP). "A
total of 142 developing countries benefit from the extensive EU preferences under the
recently enhanced GSP. In addition, 77 Africa Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs)
also benefit from preferential access to the EU market (more than 80% of African ex-
ports enter the EU at preferential or zero rates). Furthermore, the EU has concluded
free trade agreements with a number of developing countries (these agreements have
been made with Mexico, South Africa and Mediterranean countries). This preferential
access is reflected in the much higher level of exports from these countries to the EU,
compared to other Quad members." EU Institution Press Release, Facts and figures on
EU Trade, supra note 17.
21. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, Banana Link, at http://www.banana
link.org.uk/trade war/tradewar.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
22. Companies: Banana Companies, Banana Link at http://www.bananalink.org.uk/
companies/companies.htm. Estimates in 1997 had Dole controlling 26% of world ex-
ports, Chiquita at 25%, and Del Monte at 15%. See Adelien van de Kasteele, The Banana
Chain: The macro economics of the Banana Trade, International Union of Food, Agricul-
tural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations (1998),
(Vol. 48
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trading. 23 Despite the increase in pressure from some of the major
consuming countries to limit their power,24 these companies still
have a very strong influence over the market because of their ex-
port sales. 25 Multinationals are extremely powerful in exporting
countries, as they drive exporting countries competing with one an-
other for the multinational favor,26 forcing governments to imple-
ment and accept impositions with regards to taxes, tariff
preferences, preferential access to loans, and deregulation of social
and environmental policies.
27
Multinationals also have a strong influence in industrialized
countries on the implementation of food and trade policies.28 An
example of one multinational's power is Chiquita, which strongly
influenced the formal application filed by the U.S. against the EU's
banana import regime29 to the World Trade Organization in
available at http://www.bananalink.org.uk/documents/The%20Banana%2OChain%20
by%20A%20van%20de%2OKasteele.doc (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
23. Companies: Banana Companies, Banana Link at http://www.bananalink.org.
uk/companies/companies.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
24. Id. Major consuming countries, such as the EU countries, try to limit and alter
the multinational's power and behavior through these countries own codes of conduct,
legislation and campaigns.
25. Id. The total banana export revenue of the main African, Caribbean, Pacific
countries, for instance, is equivalent to 10% of Chiquita's sales. The total projected
amount of export in bananas from the ACP countries is 1037 thousand tons. See also
EU Institution Press Release, Facts and figures on EU Trade, supra note 17.
26. See Daniel T. Griswold and Aaron Lukas, Cato Handbook for the 106th Congress,
Chapter 56, Trade Sanctions, pg. 555, available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/hand
book/hb1O6-56.pdf. There is belief by some that foreign direct investment is not only
profitable for American shareholders, but that it also helps foster greater economic
growth in less developed nations. American companies introduce new technologies
and production methods, while raising wages and labor standards. That creation of
wealth helps to advance social, political, and economic institutions that are indepen-
dent of the ruling authorities. (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
27. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21.
28. During the Clinton Administration, the U.S. imposed trade sanctions against
the EU during the banana dispute. Carl Lindner, president of Chiquita Banana and a
major campaign contributor, proposed these sanctions. Shannon Jones, U.S. imposes
tariff sanctions on European luxury goods, The International Committee of the Fourth In-
ternational, March 1999, available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/marl
9 9 9 /
trad-m05.shtml; Michael Weisskopf, Going Bananas: Chiquita's Slippery Influence; The Busy
Back-Door Men, Time, Mar. 31 1997, at 40.
29. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21. ("In order to manage
the volume of bananas entering the market, the European Union fixed quotas for the
different production zones. For imports in excess of the volumes fixed in these quotas,
exports incurred a prohibitive tariff to prevent oversupply.
20041
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1995.30 This course of action taking by the U.S. eventually led to
the "Banana War", and demonstrates Chiquita and other multina-
tionals' persuasiveness in industrialized countries. 31
B. The Banana Trade War
A crisis had been brewing in the world trade market since 1993
when the EU imposed a new quota system (the "banana regime")
for banana imports for the purpose of managing the European
Market.3 2 The EU had several objectives when they implemented
this system: to harmonize the various pre-1993 national regimes; to
protect banana production in EU member states; to supply Euro-
pean consumers with 'reasonably' priced bananas; to respect Euro-
pean obligations towards Africa, Caribbean, Pacific 33 countries, as
defined by the Lom6 Convention,3 4 in order to support the eco-
The annual ACP banana quota allowed the 12 'traditional' African and Caribbean
producer countries to export, tariff-free, up to a maximum annual volume of 857,700
tons - the equivalent of their cumulated, best annual exports before 1992. Volumes
were to be allocated to each of the twelve according to a system of licenses, which is an
authorization to import for which the trading company applied. The European Com-
mission issues these licenses free of charge.
The annual quota for dollar bananas was initially set at 2 million tons with a tariff
of 100 euros per ton. Following negotiations in 1994, the EU with four producer coun-
tries signed the so-called Framework Agreement: Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua and
Venezuela. The dollar quota was raised to 2.1 million tons (then 2.2 million tons the
following years) and the tariff was reduced to 75 euros per ton. The four countries
were allocated almost 50% of the import licenses. Additionally, importing companies
needed an export certificate delivered by the exporting country authorities and an im-
port license specific to the country of origin. Although granted free by the European
Commission in function of the type of operator, a semi-legal trade developed between
import companies - due to the fact that importers would like to sell more bananas on
the EU market than the regime allowed them to import.").
30. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21.
31. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21.
32. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21.
33. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21. ACP stands for the
group African, Caribbean, Pacific countries that signed the Lom6 Convention with the
European Union.
34. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21. ("The Lom6 Conven-
tion was a trade and aid agreement that the EU signed in 1975 with 48 of its ex-colonies.
These preferential trade arrangements permitted duty-free access for a range of com-
modities on which the economies of the ex-colonies are extremely dependent. From
July 1993 until February 2000, 12 ACP countries that traditionally exported bananas to
the EU market benefited from duty-free access to the EU market under the so-called
'Banana Protocol' of the Lom6 Convention.").
[Vol. 48
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nomic development of these countries; and to reconcile interna-
tional obligations (notably under GATT35 ) with national interests.
36
However, the tariffs on the non-ACP countries by the EU's banana
regime created an oversupply of bananas that affected the remain-
der of the industry.37 Much of this surplus could be traced to Ecua-
dor, which accounts for 34 percent of world banana exports and is
the world's largest banana exporter.
38
As an immediate response to the oversupply, U.S. multina-
tional companies increased exports to the U.S., while seeking new
markets in the "emerging economies" of Eastern Europe, Russia
and Asia.3 9 For a time, these new markets were able to absorb large
quantities of export bananas that could no longer be sold to the
EU. 40 However, the economic crises in Asia and Russia in 1998
caused banana exports to these areas to drop dramatically.41 By
35. See CIESIN Thematic Guide on Political Institutions and Global Environmen-
tal Change, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, at http://www.ciesin.org/TG/PI/
TRADE/gatt.html ("The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was first
signed in 1947. The agreement was designed to provide an international forum that
encouraged free trade between member states by regulating and reducing tariffs on
traded goods and by providing a common mechanism for resolving trade disputes.
GATT membership now includes more than 110 countries.").
36. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21.
37. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21.
38. See Bob Perillo, The Industry Crisis and Latin American Workers, U.S./Labor Edu-
cation in the Americas Project (US/LEAP), (October 28, 2000), available at http://
members.tripod.com/foroemaus/Banana Crisis.htm (last visited 1/22/04). Ecuador
accounts for 34 percent of the world banana supply and is the largest exporter of ba-
nanas. See Projection for supply and demand of Bananas to 2005, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, 1st Sess., Committee On Commodity Problems,
Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and on Tropical Fruits, U.N. Doc. CCP: BA/TF
99/5, available at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/waicent/pub/ccp/bntf99/X1065e.pdf. See also,
Banana Commodity Notes: Final Results of the 2002 season, Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations, available at http://www.fao.org/es/esc/en/20953/
20987/highlight_28367en.html.
39. Bananadrama 1: The EU Banana Regime, supra note 21.
40. See Perillo, supra note 38.
41. Id. In 1998, Russia went through a series of economic pitfalls that put its econ-
omy in a serious crisis. See also Turmoil in Russia: Chronology of a Crisis, CNN.com at
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/09/crisis.russia/index.html; During the same
year, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand also
went through economic turmoil as these market sought to stabilize their economies.
See also Japan pledges $30 billion to aid Asian economies as G7 meets, CNN.com, Oct. 3, 1998
at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/03/g7.meeting.01/index.html.
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mid 1999, the industry was clearly facing a structural oversupply
without historical precedent.
42
In 1996, a little more than a year after the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) 43 , there were five countries -
Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico and the United States -
that lodged a complaint against certain elements of the banana re-
gime which they considered 'discriminatory' to their interests44.
The United States, involved on behalf of their multinational compa-
nies, was especially keen to increase its access to the European mar-
ket.45 Ecuador also claimed that they had insufficient access to the
European market.
46
A panel report issued by the WTO on September 9, 1997,
agreed that the EU banana regime was discriminatory and ordered
the import regime amended. 47 The WTO's appellate body af-
firmed the panel's conclusions in October 1997.48 In an attempt to
comply with the WTO ruling, the EU revised its banana importa-
42. Perillo, supra note 38. See also Robert Perillo, Banana Workers and Transnation-
als: An Industry Crisis, U.S./Labor Education in the Americas Project (US/LEAP), (Oct.
28, 2000), at http://www.usleap.org/Banana/crisis/BananaStudy8-00.html.
43. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was setup in January 1995 to promote
trade liberalization which had been an agenda pursued by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). World Trade Organization, WI'O, Banana Link, at http://
www.bananalink.org.uk/trade-war/tradewar.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
44. Bananadrama 2: Challenges to the EU Banana Regime, Banana Link, at http://
www.bananalink.org.uk/trade-war/trade war-main2.htm#chal (last visited Feb. 25,
2002). ("When a complaint is filed with the WTO, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) sets up a Special Group to resolve these complaint. This group is a panel of
experts whose role it is to determine whether the policy challenged by the plaintiffs is
compatible or not with the base principles of the W"TO. This Special Group - or Panel -
can summon any country, directly concerned or not, to appear before its experts.")
45. See Id.
46. See Id.
47. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas:
Ecuador's Complaint: Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. 'AT/DS27/R/ECU, May 22, 1997.
48. "The WTO found that among the violated provisions were GATT Article
XIII:1, which states that a country may not restrict the importation of a product from
one member without similarly restricting importation of that product from all other
members, and the Most Favored Nation clause, Article 1:1, which requires that any 'ad-
vantage, favor, privilege or immunity' granted to one country with respect to a certain
product be granted to all member countries with respect to that product." Tainted Har-
vest: Child Labor and Obstacles to Organizing on Ecuador's Banana Plantations, Banana Ex-
ports and Trade Regimes, Human Rights Watch, (April 2002), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2002/ecuador/ecuad42-07.htm#PI015_257403. See also Euro-
pean Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Report of the
[Vol. 48
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tion regime in January 1999.4 9 The new system continued to rely
on tariff-rate quotas50 and complex licensing schemes, but also allo-
cated over 90 percent of non-ACP country quotas to the "substantial
suppliers" of EU bananas. 51 Ecuador received 26.2 percent, Costa
Rica 25.6 percent, Colombia 23.0 percent, and Panama 15.8 per-
cent.52 However, these changes to the banana regime scheme were
found to continue to violate the WTO. In April 1999, the WTO
authorized the United States to impose trade sanctions of $191 mil-
lion against the European Union. 53 In March 2000, Ecuador also
sought and obtained authorization to impose sanctions but ab-
stained from using them.
54
C. The Dispute Resolution
On April 11, 2001, after protracted negotiations, the U.S. and
the EU agreed on a new EU banana importation regime.5 5 The
U.S. agreed to suspend sanctions and worked to secure WTO au-
thorization for the agreement. 56 Through a two-stage process shift-
ing tariff-rate quotas and licensing allocations based on companies'
histories of supplying the EU and their import/export practices,57
the new importation scheme was designed to phase in a tariff-only
Appellate Body, WArTo Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R, Sept. 9, 1997, pp. 162-63. Ibid.; GATT, Arti-
cles XIII:1, 1:1.
49. Press Release, European Union News Release, April 11, 2001, supra note 11.
50. Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ) provide for imports at a favorable tariff up to a
given limit. Beyond these limits imports are unlimited, although they are subject to
higher tariffs. This is not a quota because a quota restricts imports to a given quantity,
and TRQ don't limit trade. EU Institution Press Release, Facts andfigures on EU Trade,
supra note 17.
51. See Tainted Harvest: Child Labor and Obstacles to Organizing on Ecuador's Banana
Plantations, Banana Exports and Trade Regimes, Human Rights Watch, (April 2002), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/ecuador/ecuadO42-07.htm#PIO15_257403.
52. Id.
53. EU Institution Press Release, Facts andfigures on EU Trade, supra note 17.
54. Eliza Patterson, "The US-E.U. Agreement to Resolve the Banana Dispute,"
ASIL Insight: US-E.U. Banana Dispute Agreement, April 2001, available at http://
www.asil.org/insights/insigh69.htm.
55. Press Release, European Union News Release, April 11, 2001, supra note 11.
56. See Press Release, European Union News Release, April 11, 2001, supra note 11.
The United States lifted sanctions on July 1, 2001. See also "USTR Removes Duties on
E.U. Goods Imposed in Banana Dispute," Market News International, July 2, 2001 at 2001
WL 24094930.
57. Press Release, European Union News Release, EU and Ecuador Reach Agree-
ment to Resolve V1O Banana Dispute, Apr. 30, 2001, available at http://europa.eu.
2004]
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system by 2006.58 Until 2006, however, traditional ACP countries
will continue to have their own tariff-rate quota and licensing pref-
erences, but all individual country quotas will be abolished.
59
After initially objecting to this plan, Ecuador reached an agree-
ment with the EU which addressed Ecuador's primary concerns.
60
A system was designed for allocating import licenses to protect Ec-
uadorian small and medium producers' license access. 61 In return,
Ecuador forfeited its right to impose sanctions on the EU and aban-
doned its efforts to prevent the European Union from obtaining a
WTO waiver in order to allow temporary preferential treatment of
ACP countries. 62 Under the tariff-only system scheduled to begin
in 2006, Ecuador will compete freely against other banana-produc-
ing countries for access to the EU market, as it does now for the
U.S. market access. 63 The success of the dispute settlement was visi-
ble immediately, as the Ecuadorian government statistics indicated
that imports from Ecuador into the EU had increased since the im-
plementation of the reformed EU banana regime in July 2001.64
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRADE DisPUTE RESOLUTION
Although this dispute resolution should result in increased
profit for Ecuador,65 it will equate to nothing for banana workers if
the Ecuadorian government 66 and multinationals benefiting from
in t/ rapid/ start/ cgi/ guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/0 1/ 627-0-AGED &lg=
EN&display=.
58. Patterson, supra note 54.
59. Press Release, European News Release, April 30, 2001, supra note 57.
60. Press Release, European News Release, April 30, 2001, supra note 57.
61. See Press Release, European News Release, April 30, 2001, supra note 57. See
also Human Rights Watch Supra note 15 n.386, citing: Commission Approves Banana Regs.
After Settling with Ecuador, Inside U.S. Trade, May 4, 2001, at 19. (Dole, Ecuador's sec-
ond largest exporter, had also objected to the licensing scheme because license alloca-
tion, until December 2003, is to be based on E.U. market share between 1994 and 1996,
a period during which Dole's importation of Ecuadorian bananas in the European
Union was significantly lower than in later years).
62. Press Release, European News Release, April 30, 2001, supra note 57.
63. Bananadrama 2: Challenges to the EU Banana Regime, supra note 44.
64. Bananadrama 2: Challenges to the EU Banana Regime, supra note 44.
65. Bananadrama 2: Challenges to the EU Banana Regime, supra note 44.
66. Complaint Against the Government of Ecuador presented by the IUF and CEOLS, In-
ternational Labor Organization, available at http://www.oit.org.pe/sindi/english/
casos/ecu/ecu200202.html. IUF filed a formal complaint against the government of
Ecuador with the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO.
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the workers' labor continue to deny workers their basic human
rights to form and organize unions.
67
Unions68 work to unite employees of a company to solve
problems and gain protection against unfair treatment.69 An em-
ployer can mistreat a small number of employees easily. However,
when all the employees unite, they can stand up to their employer
without fear of getting fired or demoted. 70 Workers in unions
counter-balance the unchecked power of employers7' and help
remedy discrimination because union contracts ensure that all
workers are treated fairly and equally.7 2 Without a union, workers
are left without a voice on the job to improve their lives, their fami-
lies, their communities and their working conditions.
73
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights de-
clares that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for
67. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, Article 22, Section 1, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, available at http://
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm. See also I International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 171, Article 8(1)(a), entered into force
January 3, 1976, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm.
Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state that everyone has a right to
form a union. See also Banana workers strike against race to the bottom, Global Exchange,
available at http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/bananas/. In Ecuador tempo-
rary subcontracted laborers are not allowed to form unions and are earning an average
of less than $2 a day.
68. See How and why people form unions, AFL-CIO, available at http://www.aflcio.
org/aboutunions/joinunions/. A union is a group of workers who come together to
win respect on the job, better wages and benefits, more flexibility for work and family
needs, and a voice in improving the quality of their products and services.
69. See The benefits of a union, Canadian Union of Public Employees, available at
http://www.cupe.ca/joining/whyunionswork/showitem.asp?id=1534.
70. See id.
71. See AFL-CIO, supra note 68.
72. See AFL-CIO, supra note 68.
73. See AFL-CIO, supra note 68. See also Human and Environmental Cost, Human
Impact, Banana Link, available at http://www.bananalink.org.uk/impact/impact.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2004). (Mentioning that poor living conditions, low wages, long
exhausting hours, serious health hazards, child labor, sexual harassment are all other
human rights concerns are a direct result of a lack of a union to protect workers against
such violations).
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the protection of his interests. ' 74 It also states that "nothing in this
article shall authorize States to take legislative measures which
would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to
prejudice the guarantees provided for in that Convention. '75 The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
also provides workers with: "The right to form trade unions with no
restrictions"; 76 "The right of trade unions to function freely subject
to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society";77 and "The right to strike, pro-
vided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particu-
lar country. ' 78  Both the International Labor Organization
Convention concerning Freedom of Association 79 and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights declare that banana workers have
the right to associate and to form a union.80 The absences of these
rights expose banana workers to an even longer list of concurrent
problems with greater human rights concerns.
8'
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
Article 22, Section 1, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm. See also Status of Ratifications of the Principal International
Human Rights Treaties, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human
Rights, (Nov. 2, 2003) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (Ecuador rat-
ified the ICCPR on Mar. 23, 1976).
75. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A., Article 22, Section
3.
76. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S.
171, Article 8(1)(a), entered into force January 3, 1976, available at http://
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm. See also Status of Ratifications of the Princi-
pal International Human Rights Treaties, Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner For Human Rights, (November 2, 2003) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
pdf/report.pdf (Ecuador ratified the ICESCR on Jan. 3, 1976).
77. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article
8(1) (c).
78. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article
8(1) (d).
79. See ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize (ILO No. 87), 68 U.N.T.S. 17, July 4, 1950, Article 2, 3 and 4. ILO
Convention No. 87 was ratified by Ecuador on May 29, 1967, available at http://
unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/s - 1/087.htm.
80. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights G. A. res 217 A (III), 10 December
1948, Article 23 (4) available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/bludhr.htm.
81. See also Human and Environmental Cost, Human Impact, Banana Link, available
at http://www.bananalink.org.uk/impact/impact.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
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While banana production in Central America, Panama and Co-
lombia is often unionized, less than 1 percent of Ecuador's banana
workers belong to a union.8 2 Wages for Ecuadorian banana work-
ers are considerably lower than those of unionized banana workers
elsewhere. 83 Additionally, the numerous social benefits that ba-
nana unions in other countries have won for their members
through long struggles are almost entirely absent in Ecuador's ba-
nana sector.8
4
A. The Ecuadorian Government
While the Ecuadorian Constitution 85 and Labor Code86 guar-
antees the right to organize, it does not require reinstatement of
workers fired for union activity.87 Instead, an employer need only
pay a relatively small fine for an anti-union dismissal, less than $400
82. See David Bacon, Blood on the Bananas, Jun. 12, 2002, at http://www.kclabor.
org/blood-on-thebananas.htrm. "Over 90% of the banana workers in Colombia and
Panama belong to unions and 40% in Guatemala. Only Costa Rica's 6% approaches
Ecuador's miniscule 1% of banana workers (1650 people) who are organized." See also
Tainted Harvest: Summary, Apr. 2002, supra note 15.
83. "In many countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama, workers have
struggled to form unions and raise wages to as much as $11 a day. But in Ecuador
temporary subcontracted laborers are not allowed to form unions and are earning an
average of less than $2 a day. Workers around the world are experiencing significant
roll-backs due to the continuing crisis in the banana industry." Banana workers strike
against race to the bottom, Global Exchange, at http://www.globalexchange.org/econo
my/bananas/.
84. See Perillo, supra note 40. (These social benefits include health care, housing,
electricity, potable water, education for their children). See also Global Commodities': Ba-
nanas, Coffee, Rural Migration News, October 2002, Volume 8, Number 4, at http://
migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=630-0-5-0. In 2000, banana workers earned
from $60 a month in Ecuador to $150 to $200 in Honduras and $200 to $300 a month
in Colombia.
85. See Constitution, Article 35(9), available at http://www.georgetown.edu/
pdba/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98. html.
86. Labor Code, Articles 447, 467, available at http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/
S97ECU0l.htm.; see also ILO Convention, supra note 79.
87. Human Rights Watch, supra note 15. See also Labor Code, Article 626, availa-
ble at http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECU01.htm. See also Mariano Cortes, Fernando De-
lagdo, Alvin Hilaire, Gabreiela Inchauste, Werner Keller, Erick Offerdal, and Mayra
Zermeno, Ecuador: Selected Issues and Statistical Annex, IMF, Country Report No. 00/125,
October 18, 2000, p. 57, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2000/
cr00125.pdf. The IMF has noted that the enforcement of minimum wages in Ecuador
is weak, "since the punishment for noncompliance with labor legislation is relatively
low."
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
in most cases involving a banana worker. 88 In Ecuador, most large-
scale producers employ a system of temporary contract labor that
severs the formal link between employer and employee. 89 Work
teams, or "cuadrillas," consisting of 12 to 15 workers which are paid
by the day or by the task.90 The team leader, or 'jefe de cuadrilla,"
may in fact be a formal employee of the plantation, but he contracts
the rest of the "cuadrilleros."91 This is how many banana workers
drop to the title of "non-union workers." As temporary workers
they do not fall under labor legislation and are generally excluded
from all social security, employment, and health care benefits.
92
Ecuador's refusal to impose its own Labor Code provisions that
govern labor contracts along with the ambiguity of those provisions
allows employers to create a defenseless "permanent temporary"
workforce in the banana sector.93 The lack of enforcement is what
allows for "the informal use of consecutive contracts and multiple
project contracts." 94 Short term contracts are run in succession,
one after the other, for many months or years on end, which cre-
ates an unstable "permanent temporary" workforce. 95 The problem
with creating a work force like this is that these workers are not
entitled to benefits due to employees recognized as permanent in
the eyes of the law, and their employers are not bound by Labor
88. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15. See Labor Code, Article 626,
available at http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECUO1.htm.
89. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15. ("The Labor Code also per-
mits the use of temporary contracts, not to exceed thirty days, for workers hired to
attend to emergencies or extraordinary business needs that, unlike the everyday
processing or field activities of banana workers, are not linked to the normal activity of
the employers. Seasonal contracts may also be used to hire workers for cyclical labor
and are understood to create the right for such workers to be hired back the following
cycle or season. As banana production in Ecuador is not cyclical and, instead, involves
the performance of all phases of production activity year-round, seasonal contracts are
generally not used in the sector."). See also Labor Code, Article 17, available at http://
natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECUO1 .htm.
90. See Perillo, supra note 38.
91. See Perillo, supra note 38.
92. See Perillo, supra note 38; See also Labor Code, Articles 14, 16, available at
http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECU01.htm.
93. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
94. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
95. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
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Code provisions that prohibit anti-union dismissals.9 6 If the tempo-
rary workers are suddenly told not to return to work the following
day or week, they have not technically been fired; they have simply
not been rehired.97 As such, the Labor Code does not explicitly
prohibit anti-union discrimination in rehiring. 98
The use of subcontracted labor has also raised unreasonable
obstacles to worker organizations. 99 Subcontracted workers, like
"permanent temporary" workers, lack employment stability.100 Sub-
contracted workers do not have the legal rights to organize and col-
lectively bargain with the companies and employers benefiting
from their labor, despite the fact that these companies may deter-
mine their wages, benefits, and working conditions. 10 1 These sub-
contracted workers are, instead, able to organize and negotiate
collectively only with their subcontractors and not the company. 10 2
Another obstacle employers frequently use is to place workers in
groups of less than thirty workers, which avoid the thirty worker
requirement by law to form a workers' organization.1 03
The deterrent to unionize is so strong in Ecuador that the or-
ganization of banana workers has been significantly shut down. 104
The constitutionally and internationally protected right to freedom
of association has been rendered a fiction for most banana workers
96. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15. See also Labor Code, Articles
169, 172, 180, available at http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECU01.htm.
97. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
98. Labor Code, Article 181, available at http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECU01.
htm.
99. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
100. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
101. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15. ("Similarly, according to the
Labor Code, an employer and that employer's intermediary hired to contract personnel
to perform everyday company tasks share "joint responsibility" for the violation of "obli-
gations to the worker.") See also Constitution, Article 35(11), available at http://
www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98.html. See also Labor
Code, Article 41, available at http://natlex.ilo.org/txt/S97ECU01.htn.
102. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
103. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
104. There are numerous examples of banana workers being fired for forming and
joining unions. BANANA WORKERS FIRED IN ECUADOR.' Days after strike for a union, 120
workers fired!, US/LEAP Action Alert, US/LEAP, 3-18-02, available at http://
www.usleap.org/Banana/Noboa/FiringAlert3-18-02.html. If successful in forming un-
ions, there have been examples of armed guards firing on union demonstrations. Juan
Forero, In Ecuador's Banana Fields, Child Labor Is Key to Profits, The New York Times July
13, 2002, at Al.
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in the sector.10 5 As a result of the impediments to and risks in exer-
cising the right to freedom of association, workers have successfully
organized on only roughly five of the more than 5,000 registered
banana plantations in Ecuador, and only approximately 1,650 of
the 120,000 to 148,000 banana workers are affiliated with workers'
organizations. 10 6 This lack of affiliation helps make Ecuador the
world leader in banana exports and will only encourage Ecuador to
continue social deregulations to keep production costs low in order
to reach the expanded EU market.
10 7
B. Multinational Corporations
Since their creation at the end of the 19th Century, multina-
tional companies succeeded in maintaining extremely high profit
margins' 08 by combining inexpensive overseas raw materials and la-
bor markets with European and U.S. management and capital. 10 9
While there are legitimate arguments that foreign investment cre-
ates work that did not previously exist in developing countries,110
multinational banana producers tend to repatriate most of their
profits to their countries of origin.11' Only 12% of the final price
stays in the producing countries, while an even smaller proportion
goes to small farmers (5-10 per cent) or to plantation workers (1-2
per cent).112 To produce large amounts of cheap, unblemished ba-
nanas to sell, the multinational companies favor very intensive
105. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
106. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15. The banana worker affiliation
rate of Ecuador is far lower than that of Colombia or any Central American banana-
exporting country. See also Bacon, supra note 82.
107. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15. See also Consequences for Latin
America, Bananadrama 3, Consequence of Liberalization, Banana Link, available at
http://www.bananalink.org.uk/trade-war/trade-war.htm.
108. Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23.
109. George V. Sherman, Jr., In Defense of Multinational Corporations, July 1-5, 2001,
available at http://bastiat.net/en/Bastiat2001/george.v.sherman.html.
110. Id. See also Corporate Responsibility Report, Standards for Independent Ba-
nana Growers, Chiquita Brands International, Inc, available at http://
www.chiquita.com/chiquitacrl/4cases/cro72.asp. See also Griswold & Lucas, supra note
26.
111. Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23.
112. Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23.
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methods of production, 13 using large volumes of fertilizers and
pesticides to increase the amount of input.1 4 In a situation of over-
supply, as was the case in 2000, prices paid to independent produc-
ers were systematically below production costs, forcing wages
down.' 1
5
In recent years, these big companies have tried to free them-
selves of direct ownership of plantations, in favor of guaranteed
supply contracts with medium- and large-scale producers in the
countries where they operate.1 16 This tactic allows the multina-
tional headquarters to avoid culpability for labor and environmen-
tal conditions and shifts this responsibility onto local producers by
claiming to be only the buyers of these goods.' 17 The multination-
als argue that the supplier plantations are private property over
which they have no jurisdiction and that the decisions regarding
labor matters are the prerogative of the landowners and therefore
out of their hands. ' 8 Although the governments are still the pri-
mary bodies accountable for upholding human rights everywhere,
the multinational are fully aware' 1 9 of the production methods and
113. Work on banana plantations exposes workers to pesticides so hazardous that
the EPA bans them in the United States. Two of them, diazinon and chlorpyrifos, are
sprayed on plastic sheets which workers use to wrap the bunches. The EPA cautions
that they're especially dangerous to children, even in low doses. Both are orga-
nophosphates, originally developed as nerve gas agents in World War II. David Bacon,
Blood on the Bananas, 6/12/02 available at http://www.kclabor.org/blood on-the-ba-
nanas.htm.
114. See Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23. See also Human and Environmental
Impact, Banana Link, supra note 81. ("The increase in exports from these regions in the
past decades or so has been achieved mainly through increasing the amount of inputs
(fertilizers and pesticides) and the area under cultivation.").
115. See Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23.
116. See Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23.
117. See Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23. See also Tainted Harvest: Child La-
bor and Obstacles to Organizing on Ecuador's Banana Plantations, Banana-Exporting Compa-
nies, Human Rights Watch, (April 2002), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/
ecuador/ecuad0402-06.htm#P863_208237.
118. Tainted Harvest: Child Labor and Obstacles to Organizing on Ecuador's Banana Plan-
tations, Banana-Exporting Companies, Human Rights Watch, (April 2002), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2002/ecuador/ecuadO402-06.htm#P863-208237.
119. See Corporate Responsibility Report, Standards for Independent Banana
Growers, Chiquita Brands International, Inc., available at http://www.chiquita.com/
chiquitacrl/4cases/cro72.asp. Chiquita states in this report that Ecuador's expansion
has been fueled by lower labor, social, and environmental standard than are generally
present in the rest of Latin America.
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lack of union representation from the companies whom they bene-
fit.1 20 The responsibility of the multinationals for these human
rights violations of banana workers is therefore inescapable. 12'
The failure of the Ecuadorian government to enforce its labor
laws results in human rights abuse that underlies the production of
millions of metric tons of bananas supplied to exporting corpora-
tions every year.1 22 This lack of sufficient legal protections for
workers' rights allows banana producers to violate workers' rights
with impunity. 123 Exporting corporations contract directly with
these national producers and benefit from these violations by re-
ceiving bananas at almost half the market price, 124 produced under
abusive labor conditions and by workers making barely enough to
survive. 125 In fact, multinationals export over four million metric
tons of Ecuadorian bananas annually, but have disclaimed any obli-
gation to demand respect for workers' rights on third-party planta-
tions from which they purchase bananas for export.126
When labor rights abuses occurs on these plantations and ex-
porting corporations fail to take remedial steps to ensure respect
for workers' rights, multinationals not only facilitate the problems
120. Human Rights Watch, Banana Exporting Companies, supra note 118. See also
Pierre Sane, Why Human Rights Should Matter to the Business World, UN Reform, (January
8, 2001) at http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/2001/0108ps.htm.
121. Pierre Sane, Why Human Rights Should Matter to the Business World, UN
Reform, (Jan. 8, 2001) at http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/2001/0108ps.htm.
122. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
123. Human Rights Watch, Banana Exporting Companies, supra note 118.
124. "A 20 kilogram (43 pound) box of bananas sells in Ecuador for $2 to $3, and is
worth $25 in the United States or Europe." Global Commodities: Bananas, Coffee, Rural
Migration News, October 2002, Volume 8 Number 4, at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/
rmn/archive-rmn/oct_2002-20rmn.html. See also Andrew Bounds, Banana Wars, Latin
Trade, (June 2001), at http://www.uwec.edu/geography/Ivogeler/wl ll/articles/Bana
naWars.htm. Ecuador is selling below cost, at around $1.50 for a 42-pound box. Costa
Rican bananas, by comparison, cost $4.40 a box to produce and sell for about a dollar
more ($5.50).
125. The average salary of Ecuadorian Banana workers amounted to only $5.44 a
day with no insurance. The result is that two working adults in a family of four often
make less than the almost $300 a month that Ecuador's labor ministry estimates is the
basic cost of living in the banana-producing region. Jim Lobe, Labor Abuses Rampant in
Banana Plantations, OneV~orld US, (April 25, 2002) at http://www.corpwatch.org/
news/PND.jsp?articleid=2409.
126. Id. See also Report of the 1st Sess. of the Intergovernmental Group on Ba-
nanas and on Tropical Fruits, FAO Comm. On Commodity Problems, 63rd Sess. U.N.
Doc. CCP BA/TF 99/17. See also Human Rights Watch, supra note 118.
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but also benefit from these violations.' 27 The reality is that govern-
ments, such as Ecuador, see multinationals as not only providing
benefits to the economy of the host nation but also providing bene-
fits to the political leadership who is credited with the growth in the
overall economy of the nation. 28 These governments compete for
multinational favors1 29 by offering them short-term advantages. In
exchange, these governments hope that acceleration in national de-
velopment will soon follow. 130 The wholesale giants who are daily
gaining greater control over the terms of trade need to accept cul-
pability for labor and environmental conditions and break this
damaging cycle of competition if they want real credibility as re-
sponsible corporate citizens.
131
V. WHAT IS THE ANSWER?
The biggest beneficiaries of the WTO Settlement, the Ecuado-
rian government and the US multinationals, are also the groups
most responsible for the failure of banana workers to have a right to
association.' 3 2 The legislation needed to solve these problems, al-
though ambiguous, is already in place in Ecuador. 133 However, the
entity enforcing this legislation is the Ecuadorian government,
which has repeatedly neglected to strictly enforce the portions of
their law that guarantee workers the right to organize.134 The mul-
127. Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
128. See History of the Global Corporation, Global Links Consulting, available at http:/
/www.globallinksconsulting.com/Global%20Inc/pgs/hist.html.
129. An example of the advantages given to multinationals is reduced labor and
production cost. Because of the non-union labor of Ecuador, the country is selling
below cost, at around $1.50 for a 42-pound box. Costa Rican bananas, by comparison,
cost $4.40 a box to produce and sell for about a dollar more ($5.50). Andrew Bounds,
Banana Wars, Latin Trade, (June 2001), available at http://www.uwec.edu/geography/
Ivogeler/w1 I I/articles/BananaWars.htm. The result is a shift in much of big 3 mul-
tinationals (Chiquita (United Brands), Dole Farming Company, and Del Monte) pro-
duction to Ecuador, which is now the world's largest exporter. David Bacon, Labor-
Ecuador: U.S. Groups Condemn Abuses on Banana Plantations, Internal Press Service, avail-
able at http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/article 06_20_02ecuadorbananas.html.
130. Global Links Consulting, supra note 128.
131. Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23.
132. Banana Link, supra note 23.
133. See Labor Code, supra note 86.
134. See US/LEAP Comments Regarding Eligibility Criteria for Ecuador for ATPDEA Trade
Benefits, US/LEAP, September 16, 2002, at http://www.usleap.org/Banana/
ATPDEAComments9-16-02.html (Stating "The fact that the Alamos plantations are
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tinationals also have administrative standards in place that would
solve these problems.135 Unfortunately, these standards are not
currently being enforced because of a lack of accountability on the
part of these companies. 13 6
The right to form unions is also guaranteed by other interna-
tional treaties.1 37 Without the right to form unions, other human
rights violations are inevitable and will likely go unpunished.1 3 8 Al-
though changes in the Ecuadorian government's treatment of its
banana workers may soon come with the election of a new presi-
dent, 39 the U.S. judicial and legislative system can serve as the cata-
owned by Ecuador's largest banana company, the Noboa Corporation, run by the coun-
try's most prominent businessman, makes this high-profile case a key one for assessing
respect for worker right's in Ecuador. If the Alamos workers are denied their right to
organize and bargain collectively and if those responsible for the violence against them
are not prosecuted in the wake of the Human Rights Watch report, a U.S. congressional
staff delegation, and significant media attention, banana workers throughout the coun-
try will know that Ecuador lacks the political will to enforce criminal and labor law and
ensure respect for worker rights in the country's largest industry.").
135. E.g., SAI8000: Overview of SA8000, Social Accountability International, at http:/
/www.cepaa.org/SA8000/SA8000.htm. See also SA18000, Social Accountability Interna-
tional at http://www.cepaa.org/Document%20Center/2001StdEnglishFinal.doc.
("The first standard to be fully operational is Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000), a
workplace standard that covers all key labor rights and certifies compliance through
independent, accredited auditors. This standard specifies requirements for social ac-
countability to enable a company to: a) develop, maintain, and enforce policies and
procedures in order to manage those issues which it can control or influence;
b)demonstrate to interested parties that policies, procedures and practices are in con-
formity with the requirements of this standard. The requirements of this standard shall
apply universally with regard to geographic location, industry sector and company
size").
136. Human Rights Watch, Banana Exporting Companies, supra note 118.
137. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 74; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 76; ILO Conven-
tion concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, supra
note 79.
138. AFL-CIO, supra note 73.
139. Former coup leader Lucio Gutierrez, viewed as a crusader against corruption,
won Ecuador's presidential runoff November 24, 2002, defeating billionaire business-
man Alvaro Noboa, head of the Noboa Banana Company. Monte Hayes, Corruption





lyst that banana workers need to begin the necessary process of
social change required.
140
A. U.S. to the Rescue
The Ecuadorian banana workers should bring suit against the
participating U.S. multinationals in U.S. courts. The Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA) 141 allows a foreign plaintiff to bring suit against
U.S. defendants.1 42 In John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., the court of ap-
peals determined that no state action was required in order for the
oil companies to be liable for the alleged violations under the
ATCA. 143 There was sufficient evidence to preclude summaryjudg-
ment with respect to whether the oil companies aided and abetted
the military in subjecting the villagers to forced labor, murder, and
rape. 1 4 4
The denial of the right to organize is a violation of several in-
ternational laws, all of which have been signed by the United
States. 145 Multinational corporations may think they have relative
impunity because they are not the direct employers of the workers
140. An example of the slow process of change is that after over 11 months of
harassment, firings, and two brutal violent attacks on striking workers, striking banana
workers on the Los Alamos Plantation in Ecuador ended their struggle on November
28, 2002 and returned to work under terms of an agreement that won them health
benefits and medical care for injuries resulting from attacks on May 16, 2002, but little
else. Despite significant pressure on Alvaro Noboa, owner of the plantation's manage-
ment refused to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement to improve wages and
working conditions. Noboa Workers Reinstated, Win Medical Benefits. New Campaign Begins,
US/LEAP Action Alert, US/LEAP, (Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://www.usleap.
org/Banana/bananatemp.html#noboa.
141. 28 USCS § 1350 - District Court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nation or a treaty of the
United States.
142. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18,
2002).
143. Id. at 32.
144. See id. at 58 ("The crimes of forced labor, murder, and rape were considered
jus cogens violations. Jus cogens violations are violations of norms of international law
that are binding on nations even if they do not agree to them.").
145. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 74;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 76; See also
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights, (Nov. 2, 2003) available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. (U.S. ratified the ICCPR on Sept. 8, 1992 and
the ICESCR on Oct. 5, 1977).
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and they are not directly denying the workers their rights.1 46 How-
ever, in order to qualify as aiding and abetting under international
criminal law, assistance need not constitute an indispensable ele-
ment, that is, a sine qua non1 47 for the acts of the principal.'
48
Rather, it suffices that the acts of the accomplice have a substantial
effect on the commission of the criminal act by the principal.1
49
The acts of the accomplice have the required substantial effect
where the criminal act most probably would not have occurred in
the same way without someone acting in the role that the accom-
plice in fact assumed.
150
In Doe v Unocal Corp., Unocal had a 28% interest in the My-
anmar Oil Project (the Project) to produce, transport and sell natu-
ral gas from deposit in Myanmar.151 Unocal had knowledge that
the Myanmar military provided security and other services for the
Project. 152 Unocal was also made aware, several times and by sev-
eral different methods, of the Myanmar military's use of forced la-
bor and of the other human rights violations that the military
employed in connection with the Project.153 Despite having this
knowledge, Unocal chose to listen to the assurance of the Myanmar
military that no human rights abuses were occurring in the area of
pipeline construction. 154 Unocal and its partner in the project, To-
146. Human Rights Watch, Banana Exporting Companies, supra note 117.
147. Sine qua non (see-nay kwah nahn) prep. Latin for "without which it could not
be," an indispensable action or condition. Example: if Charlie Careless had not left the
keys in the ignition, his 10-year-old son could not have started the car and backed it
over Polly Playmate. So Charlie's act was the sine qua non of the injury to Playmate.
148. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 45-46 (9th Cir.
2002).
149. Id. at 46.
150. Id. at 46.
151. Id. at 4. Burma had been ruled by a military government since 1958. In 1988,
a new military government took control and renamed the country Myanmar.
152. Id. at 6.
153. Id. at 12-20. ("Several Plaintiffs testified that the Myanmar military subjected
them to act of murder, rape and torture. Unocal was informed by its own employee,
consultants, by partners in the project and by human rights organizations, that the My-
anmar military was using forced labor and committing other human rights violations in
connection with the Project. In fact, in December 11, 1995, Unocal ConsultantJohn
Hassesman reported to Unocal that the military's most common human rights viola-
tions are 'forced relocation without compensation of families from land near/along the
pipeline; forced labor to work on infrastructure projects supporting the pipeline...
and imprisonment and/or execution by the army of those opposing such actions.'").
154. Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 20-21.
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tal, made the statement that even if forced labor were being used,
they did not have a responsibility to monitor the military's behav-
ior.1 55 This evidence was enough for the district court to hold that
a reasonable fact finder could find Unocal's conduct met the stan-
dard for aiding and abetting.
156
The denial of union association and the use of forced labor are
both violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Right as well
as a number of other international treaties.1 57 In Doe v. Unocal, the
court recognized that crimes of this nature, that are so widely con-
demned, reach the status of a jus cogens158 and therefore do not
require state action to fall under the ATCA. 159 Multinationals in
Ecuador continue to aid and encourage banana producers to vio-
late human rights of workers by accepting bananas from these pro-
ducers,1 60 despite having full knowledge of these crimes. 161 Similar
to the corporate defendant in Doe v. Unocal, multinationals have
knowledge of the crimes, yet they deny culpability for these crimes
from which they profit. 162 Because these violations of human rights
would mostly likely not occur if the banana producers where not
trying so desperately to increase production for multinational favor,
the Ecuadorian workers would have a cause of action under the
ATCA that would probably survive summary judgment.1
6
3
155. See id. at 6.
156. Id. at 10.
157. ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, supra note 79; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
79.
158. Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at 40 ("Jus cogens violations are violations
of norms of international law that are binding on nations even if they do not agree to
them"). See also S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1301 (lth Cir. 2000).
("Interpreting § 1605 (a) (1), the Supreme Court held 'we [do not] see how a foreign
state can waive its immunity under § 1605(a) (1) by signing an international agreement
that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit in United States courts or even
the availability of a cause of action in the United States.").
159. Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at 8.
160. See Banana Link, Companies, supra note 23; Human Rights Watch, Banana
Exporting Companies, supra note 118; Human Rights Watch, Summary, supra note 15.
(Explaining that despite receiving over 85% of the profits from the exporting of over 4
million metric tons of bananas, multinationals still do not accept culpability for the
human rights violations of banana workers in Ecuador).
161. See Corporate Responsibility Report, supra note 119.
162. See Human Rights Watch, Banana Exporting Companies, supra note 118. See
also Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at 5.
163. See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at 26.
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The workers may also be able to sue the country of Ecuador
itself, even though the U.S. courts usually do not allow plaintiffs to
sue a foreign nation.' 64 However, if the nation falls into one of the
several exceptions, 165 then jurisdiction becomes proper for the for-
eign state and the U.S. court is allowed to decide the case. 166 Ecua-
dor possibly falls under at least one of the exceptions of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act listed in 28 USC § 1605. Under Section
(a) (2) ,167 a foreign state shall not be immune from jurisdiction of
courts of the United States in any case in which the action is based
on an act outside the U.S. in connection with a commercial activ-
ity168 of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct ef-
fect 69 in the United States.1 70 For example in S & Davis Int'l, Inc.
v. Yemen, the commercial activity was a contract for the foreign
state's purchase of grain from a private U.S. dealer, where the for-
164. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1330 (2003) (stating that "under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, 1602, a district court has jurisdiction over a civil action against a foreign
state-including its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities-only if one of
several exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity applies").
165. See 28 USC § 1605 (2003). ("General exceptions to the jurisdictional immu-
nity of a foreign state (a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case- (2) in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States.").
166. Id.
167. S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000). ("Inter-
preting § 1605 (a) (1), the Supreme Court held 'we [do not] see how a foreign state can
waive its immunity under § 1605(a) (1) by signing an international agreement that con-
tains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit in United States courts or even the
availability of a cause of action in the United States."').
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2003). ("A 'commercial activity' means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The com-
mercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.").
169. See Davis, 218 F.3d at 1298 (Stating that "the 'direct effects' component of the
commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity is inextricably intertwined with
the "minimum contacts" component of the personal jurisdiction issue. .. ).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (2). See also Davis, 218 F.3d at 1302 ("Stating 'import-
export transactions involving sales to, or purchases from, concerns in the United States'
are included within the conduct of the first clause of § 1605(a) (2) and defining com-
mercial activity under § 1603(d) to include 'a single contract, if of the same character as
a contract which might be made by a private person').
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eign government agency "was more involved than a mere regulator,
and whose directives, not based upon regulatory reasons, con-
trolled" the foreign corporations actions. 171 Thus, because the
court considers the contract for the purchase of grain a commercial
activity, the production and selling of bananas in Ecuador to U.S.
consumers could also be considered a commercial activity.
However, the actual violation of a failure to protect the banana
workers' right to organize is not likely to be viewed as a commercial
activity by the Supreme Court.172 The Supreme Court held in Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson that "a state engages in commercial activity where it
exercises only those powers that can also be exercised by private
citizens, as distinct from those powers peculiar to sovereigns." 173 In
Nelson, although the Saudi Government subjected Nelson to the
abuse alleged as retaliation for his persistence in reporting hospital
safety violations, Nelson argued that "the character of the mistreat-
ment was consequently commercial.' 174 However, the Supreme
Court stated that "this argument does not alter the fact that the
powers allegedly abused by the Saudi government were those of po-
lice and penal officers."1 75
Ecuadorian workers can argue that the government's lack of
enforcement of its Labor Codes keeps the cost of its bananas low
and is in character a commercial activity. 176 However, like the
Saudi government's actions in Nelson, this action (or non-action) is
a power peculiar to a sovereign state. 177 Therefore, it seems un-
likely that Ecuador would fall under one of the exceptions to the
Sovereign Immunity Act by not enforcing its labor codes and pro-
tecting its banana workers' rights to form unions.' 78
171. Davis, 218 F.3d 1292, 1303.
172. See Saudi Arabia v Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993). Action brought against King-
dom of Saudi Arabia by American citizens employed at Saudi hospital, based on alleged
personal injuries resulting from unlawful detention and torture by Saudi Government,
was not "based upon a commercial activity."
173. Id. at 360.
174. Id. at 363.
175. Id. at 364.
176. See Global Exchange, supra note 83; see Bounds, supra note 124; see Lobe, supra
note 125.
177. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349.
178. Id.
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The likelihood that Ecuadorian banana workers who barely
make enough money to survive will have enough money to bear the
cost of a lengthy litigation process against huge multinationals is
highly improbable. 179 The most plausible solution by the U.S.
would be to use its trade policy leverage to oblige Ecuador into
changing its legislation and foreign policies. The United States has
a history of enacting legislation, such as sanctions (either boycotts
or embargoes),1 8 0 that encourage changes in the governments of
foreign countries that are not in agreement with U.S. policies.18 1
When looking at the fact that the U.S. imports approximately
25% of Ecuador's total banana exports,18 2 the affect of a U.S. em-
bargo against Ecuadorian bananas becomes apparent.1 8 3 Also, the
U.S. could enact narrowly targeted trade sanctions or blocking
trades with multinationals that have been shown to engage in busi-
179. See Lobe, supra note 125. See also Unocal 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263. The
original claim for this case was filed in Central District Court of California in September
of 1996. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not hear and decide on the Plaintiff's
appeals until December 3, 2001.
180. Sanction are any inducement to individuals or groups to follow or refrain
from following a particular course of conduct. Sanctions may include boycotts or em-
bargoes. Available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/si/sanction.asp.
181. Micheal Paulson, History of U.S. Sanction shows most haven't worked, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, (May 11, 1999), available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/iraq/sanc-
tion.shtml. ("Sanctions played a role in helping to force the apartheid government of
South Africa to allow democratic elections, and State Department officials claim eco-
nomic sanctions helped force Serbia to the negotiating table over the war in Bosnia and
limited Iraq's ability to rebuild its military after the 1991 Gulf War. A recent study by
the Center for Strategic and International Studies cited three other successes: blocking
the Russian transfer of sophisticated cryogenic rocket engines to India after trade sanc-
tions were threatened in July 1993; halting South African arms shipments to Syria after
a U.S. threat to withhold aid in January 1997, and imposing targeted sanctions against
China to cease exports of sensitive military equipment.").
182. See Banana Statistics, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions, 2nd Sess., Committee On Commodity Problems, Intergovernmental Group on
Bananas and on Tropical Fruits, U.N. Doc. CCP: BA/TF 01/2 (Rev 1.), available at
http://www.fao.org/es/ESC/common/ecg/28387_en-banantabrev200l.pdf. Ecuador
exports 3.942 Million tons of bananas, while the U.S. imports .839 million ton of Ecua-
dor's bananas.
183. Id. See also Daniel T. Griswold and Aaron Lukas, Cato Handbook for the 106'th
Congress, Chapter 56, Trade Sanctions, pg. 555, available at http://www.freetrade.org/
pubs/handbook/hbl06-56.pdf ("There is a raft of countries subjected to more specific
sanctions, responding to a particular behavior, and barring a particular import or a
certain type of government assistance.") See also Paulson, supra note 181 ("For instance,
Gambia and Burundi have been denied money from the Overseas Private Investment
Corp. because of military coups there.").
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ness with Ecuadorian plantations that are violating human rights.18 4
Although the sanctions would encourage change by both the mul-
tinationals and the Ecuadorian government, there has been a
strong movement to eliminate U.S. embargoes because of the
harmful effect they have on the U.S. economy and the poor and
vulnerable people of the target countries. 185
Another method of persuasion could be eliminating aid and
benefits to Ecuador. l8 6 Suspending bilateral aid and benefits are
viable ways to signal strong disapproval of the actions of foreign
governments.'1 7 A failed example of the type of action that the
U.S. could have used was demonstrated under the U.S. Andean
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) .188 On Sep-
tember 25, 2002, the United States granted ATPDEA benefits to Bo-
livia, Colombia and Peru, but not Ecuador.' 8 9 According to the
Act, before granting ATPDEA benefits, the United States must take
into account "the extent to which the country provides internation-
ally recognized worker rights, including... the right of association;
the right to organize and bargain collectively." 190
184. See Daniel T. Griswold and Aaron Lukas, Cato Handbook for the 106'th Congress,
Chapter 56, Trade Sanctions, pg. 562, available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/hand
book/hb1O6-56.pdf.
185. Id. at 555, 562.
186. See id. at 561. (Cutting U.S. aid to foreign nations is not a trade sanction).
187. See id. at 561.
188. United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Andean Trade Promo-
tion and Drug Eradication Act Implementation Instructions for Non-Textile Products (Nov. 7,
2002), available at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/impoexpo/atpdea.htm. ("The
Trade and Development Act of 2002 ("the Act"), was signed into law on August 6, 2002.
Title XXXI of the Act concerns the renewal and expansion of the Andean Trade Prefer-
ence Act (ATPA) and is entitled the 'Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication
Act' (the ATPDEA). The ATPDEA immediately restored duty free treatment to articles
that had been eligible for ATPA benefits prior to the program's expiration on Decem-
ber 4, 2001."). See also, Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 2002 HR 3009.
189. Ecuador: U.S. Caves on Labor Rights, Human Rights Watch (New York), Nov. 7,
2002 available at http://hrw.org/press/2002/11/ecuadorlabor1107.htm.
190. Id. See also Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, President Bush Signs Trade Promotion
Authority ("Fast Track") Bill, Renewal of the Andean Trade Preference Act, available at http://
www.gdclaw.com/practices/publications/detail/id/623/%3Fpubltemld%3D6469.
("Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradi-
cation Act, renews the Andean Trade Preference Act. The renewal is retroactive to De-
cember 4, 2001, the date the Andean Trade Preference Act expired. The Andean
Trade Preference Act extends preferential duty-free treatment to a large number of
products exported to the U.S. from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, including a
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At the time, Ecuador faced considerable international pressure
to investigate the anti-union violence on the Noboa Corporation's
Los Alamos banana plantations. 191 The inadequacy of Ecuadorian
labor law protecting the right to organize, the right to bargain col-
lectively, and the failure of the system to ensure the basic rights of
the Alamos workers called into serious question the country's eligi-
bility for ATPDEA designation. 192 Prior to the signing of the agree-
ment, Ecuador made several general commitments to the United
States to improve deficient labor law enforcement and review laws
on freedom of association that unfortunately fell far short of inter-
national standards.
193
The United States granted Ecuador enhanced trade benefits
under the U.S. ATPDEA on October 31, 2002, even though Ecua-
dor failed to comply with the Act's labor rights requirements.
19 4
Despite the failure to fully encourage improvement of working con-
ditions of Ecuadorian banana workers, these actions prove that the
U.S. has not only the ability but opportunity to influence Ecuador
to change its labor laws for the better.
195
number of products previously excluded from the preference program, such as textiles
and apparel products. The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act sets
forth a number of factors that the President must take into account when deciding
whether to extend preferential treatment to any country under the Andean Trade Pref-
erence Act, including steps taken by the country to comply with World Trade Organiza-
tion obligations, to protect workers' rights, and to combat corruption.").
191. Human Rights Watch, Ecuador, supra note 189.
192. US/LEAP Comments Regarding Eligibility Criteria for Ecuador for ATPDEA Trade
Benefits, US/LEAP, September 16, 2002. Available at http://www.usleap.org/Banana/
ATPDEAComments9-16-02.html.
193. Id. See also Human Rights Watch, Ecuador, supra note 189.
194. See Human Rights Watch, Ecuador, supra note 189.
195. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, President Bush Signs Trade Promotion Author-
ity ("Fast Track") Bill, Renewal of the Andean Trade Preference Act, available at http://
www.gdclaw.com/practices/publications/detail/id/623/%3Fpubltemld%3D
6 4 6 9.
("Today President George W. Bush signed into law the Trade Act of 2002, an omni-
bus trade bill that grants the President the authority to negotiate international trade
agreements subject to a single 'yes' or 'no' vote by Congress without amendments. The
Trade Act of 2002 also provides trade adjustment assistance for U.S. workers displaced
by foreign trade, renews and expands the Andean Trade Preference Act, and renews
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences.
Trade promotion authority, formerly known as "fast track" authority, authorizes
the President to negotiate international trade agreements that Congress can accept or
reject, but not amend. Trade promotion authority had been granted to five former




Ecuador should amend and enforce its labor codes to protect
banana workers and become more directly involved with the ba-
nana exporting process to help control the banana market to pro-
duce a stable income source for workers.1 96 Ecuador has several
options to remedy this problem. Ecuador could amend the Labor
Code to require the reinstatement of permanent workers fired for
engaging in union activity and payment of wages lost during the
period when the workers were wrongfully dismissed. 197 Where rein-
statement is impossible, compensation for dismissal should be sub-
stantially higher than for other illegal terminations.' 98
The Labor Code should also provide that temporary workers
and workers with project contracts who are fired for exercising the
right to freedom of association have the right to reinstatement until
the conclusion of their short-term contracts and payment of any
lost wages incurred during the period of wrongful dismissal. 199 If
reinstatement is not possible, those workers who were dismissed
should be substantially rewarded for their anti-union dismissal. 200
The labor law should also explicitly prohibit anti-union discrimina-
tion in hiring and employers from interfering in the establishment
or functioning of workers' organizations, as prohibited by the
ILO.
20 1
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, reinstates trade promotion authority, subject
to a number of conditions.").
196. See Ramon L. Espinel, The Banana Problem in Ecuador: A Regulation Proposal,
available at http://www.sica.gov.ec/ingles/cadenas/banano/docs/regulationpropo
sal.pdf. See also US/LEAP, supra note 192. See also Human Rights Watch, supra note 15.
197. US/LEAP, supra note 192.
198. Tainted Harvest: Child Labor and Obstacles to Organizing on Ecuador's Banana Plan-




201. US/LEAP, supra note 192. See also The International Labour Organization,
About the ILO, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm. ("The
International Labor Organization (ILO). The International Labor Organization is the
UN specialized agency which seeks the promotion of social justice and internationally
recognized human and labor fights. It was founded in 1919 and is the only surviving
major creation of the Treaty of Versailles which brought the League of Nations into
being and it became the first specialized agency of the UN in 1946. The ILO formu-
lates international labor standards in the form of Conventions and Recommendations
setting minimum standards of basic labor rights: freedom of association, the right to
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Ecuador could also become more directly involved with the ba-
nana exporting process.20 2 The price of Ecuadorian bananas is sig-
nificantly lower than other exporting countries.203 If Ecuador
adopts the necessary regulatory changes it can establish interna-
tional marketing conditions of its banana production. 20 4 To avoid
price decrease more than what the cyclical market imposes, the
country can discriminate prices according to those markets where it
sells. 20 5 A price must be allocated to each market, so that exporters
can agree with producers how much they are going to buy for each
market and a price will automatically be established. 20 6 By making
prices more stable for the producer, it brings a higher and more
consistent profit margin to producers, thereby alleviating the pres-
sure to keep workers from forming unions for their benefit.
C. Multinationals
Dole and Chiquita are both major corporations who export
large quantities of Ecuadorian bananas.20 7 Both corporations are
also signatory members of the workplace code of conduct
SA8000.20 8 They should therefore fulfill their public commitment
organize, collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor, equality of opportunity and
treatment, and other standards regulating conditions across the entire spectrum of
work related issues.") See also ILO Convention, supra note 79.
202. See Ramon L. Espinel, The Banana Problem in Ecuador: A Regulation Proposal.,
available at http://www.sica.gov.ec/ingles/cadenas/banano/docs/regulation-propo
sal.pdf.
203. ("Ecuador is the world's largest exporter of bananas and has been increasing
its market share by selling bananas at a significantly lower price than exporters in Cen-
tral America."). US/LEAP, Banana Update: Global Banana Crisis Threaten Central





207. Human Rights Watch, supra note 198.
208. SA18000, Social Accountability International, available at http://www.cepaa.
org/ ("The first standard to be fully operational is Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000),
a workplace standard that covers all key labor rights and certifies compliance through
independent, accredited auditors. This standard specifies requirements for social ac-
countability to enable a company to: a) develop, maintain, and enforce policies and
procedures in order to manage those issues which it can control or influence; b)
demonstrate to interested parties that policies, procedures and practices are in con-
formity with the requirements of this standard. The requirements of this standard shall
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to monitor labor conditions on third-party supplier plantations, 20 9
begin to bring all suppliers into compliance with Ecuadorian labor
law and SA8000 standards as soon as possible and at least within the
reasonable period of 180 days, and report publicly on such efforts
on at least an annual basis.
210
Chiquita should ensure that all external agreements negoti-
ated with trade union bodies or other third parties that address la-
bor rights on Chiquita's supplier plantations, like the "IUF/
COLSIBA and Chiquita Agreement on Freedom of Association,
Minimum Labor Standards and Employment in Latin American Ba-
nana Operations, '2 1' meet or exceed the standards set forth in the
company's internal code of conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to freedom of association is one of the principles in
which this country was founded. 212 Although this was a fundamen-
tal right given by the Constitution, history shows U.S. that this right
was not always guaranteed and that this right was solidified only
through the fight and hard work of many men and women.213 His-
tory also shows that without the help of unions and the right to free
apply universally with regard to geographic location, industry sector and company
size.").
209. Human Rights Watch, Specific Recommendations, supra note 198.
210. Human Rights Watch, Specific Recommendations, supra note 198.
211. IUF/COLSIBA and Chiquita Agreement on Freedom of Association, Minimum Labor
Standards and Employment in Latin American Banana Operations, IUF, available at http://
www.citinv.it/associazioni/CNMS/archivio/lavoro/chiquitaagreement.pdf.
212. U.S. CONST, amend. I.
213. See The Pullman Strike, Chicago, 1894. Available at http://www.cc.ukans.edu/
kansas/pullman/index.html. The Pullman strike of 1894 was the first national strike in
the United States. It involved over 150,000 person and twenty-seven states and territo-
ries and would paralyze the nations railway system. In supporting the capital side of this
strike, President Cleveland sent federal troops, who would fire and kill up to 20 U.S.
citizens and wounding another 20, all against the wishes of the states. The federal court
of the nation outlawed striking by the passing of the Omnibus indictment. This blow to
unionized labor would not be struck down until the passing of the Wagner act in 1935.
See also Hansen, Curtis, The Battle of the Overpass. Available at http://
www.reuther.wayne.edu/exhibits/battle.html. This was another example of the early
struggles of unions. The Battle of the Overpass is one of the most famous events in the
history of the American labor movement. This set in motion the series of event, which
after four year of efforts, resulted in a crippling at the Rouge Plant, the successfully
NLRB election and final recognition of the UAW by Ford Motor Company, in May
1941.
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association (to strike), American workers would not have secured
fair wages and decent working conditions.2 14 We now celebrate the
first labor unions' efforts through the national holiday Labor Day,
but it seems as though we have forgotten the hard work and strug-
gle involved in achieving better working conditions and fair
wages. 2 15 By extending U.S. Trade benefits to Ecuador, we are actu-
ally encouraging the same problems that our forefathers worked so
hard to alleviate in our own country. 216 While the U.S. may not be
able to completely alleviate the situation, it does have the power to
thoroughly discourage it.217 Although the recent extension of
trade benefit to Ecuador is a step backwards, it should not be the
final step. Hopefully, those fighting in the U.S.218 for Ecuador can
one day convince others that in taking a stand for Ecuador's ba-
nana workers, they are actually taking stand for the American
worker.
These two situations are very similar to the legal non-violent strike on the Los
Alamos plantations in May of 2002. See supra note 3.
214. Rico Villanueva Siasoco, Hard Labor: How unions fought to honor the American
Worker, available at http://www.infoplease.com/spot/laborI.html.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Paulson, supra note 181.
218. Lawmakers were urging the USTR not to extend new trade benefits to Ecua-
dor until it meets basic labor standards and protections. Letter from George Miller,
Member of Congress, 7th District, California & Janice D. Schakowsky, Member of Con-
gress, 9th District, Illinois to Robert B. Zoellick, Ambassador, United States Trade Rep-
resentative (Sept. 23, 2002) available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/
tradelaborletter.html.
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